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I. INTRODUCTION
POWERS of attorney1 are often used in real estate transactions forthe convenience of parties who may be traveling or otherwise un-available on the date of the closing of a transaction.2 In other situa-
tions, an agent may be acting under a durable power of attorney on
behalf of an elderly or incapacitated principal. A durable power of attor-
ney is one that is intended to continue in effect despite the principal’s
incapacity.3
As part of an estate plan, lawyers often recommend that a client exe-
cute a durable power of attorney to provide a plan for the possibility of
later incapacity. The client may execute a durable power of attorney
granting authority to an agent, often the client’s adult child, to act for the
client in the event that the client later becomes incapacitated.4 The rea-
son is to avoid an expensive guardianship proceeding. However, financial
institutions and others have often refused to accept powers of attorney or
to deal with an agent,5 thus necessitating a guardianship proceeding.
In 2006 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved and recommended the Uniform Power of Attorney Act,
replacing the original Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act.6 The new
Act was designed to address the divergence of various states from the
original act as well as problems identified by a survey of attorneys prac-
1. A power of attorney is an instrument that grants authority for an agent to act on
behalf of a principal. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 102(7) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(7) & cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The law
governing powers of attorney is a combination of common law and statutory law. Id. at 1,
pref. note.
2. A power of attorney may give an agent, sometimes called an attorney-in-fact, very
broad powers to act on behalf of the principal, UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 201(c),
including the authority to transfer an interest in real estate on behalf of the principal, id.
§ 204.
3. See UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 102(2) (“‘Durable,’ with respect to a power of
attorney, means not terminated by the principal’s incapacity.”). The traditional common
law rule was that a power of attorney would terminate on the incapacity of the principal.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.08(1). But see Trepanier v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 706 A.2d 943, 944 (Vt. 1997) (because a coma was not a permanent incapacity,
agent’s act was voidable, not void.); Cole v. McWillie, 464 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2015) (finding the power of attorney voidable).
4. The power of attorney may be effective immediately or may be drafted to become
effective at the time the principal is incapacitated. See id. § 109(a). See also John C. Craft,
Preventing Exploitation and Preserving Autonomy: Making Springing Powers of Attorney
the Standard, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 407, 464–65 (2015) (arguing that the springing power of
attorney is preferable and should be the default rule).
5. See id. § 119 cmt.; Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking
a Balance Between Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 343, 352 (2008) [her-
ineafter Whitton, Striking a Balance]; Linda S. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attor-
ney Survey Results and Analysis, NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 12–13
(2002), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/power%20of%20attorney/dpasurveyre-
port_102902.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NMX-XRE9] [hereinafter Whitton, Survey Results].
6. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT at 1, pref. note. The original Uniform Durable Power
of Attorney Act, promulgated in 1979, was widely adopted by the states. Id.
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ticing in the area,7 including the problem of parties refusing to accept
powers of attorney.8
The Texas Legislature recently adopted amendments to the Texas Du-
rable Power of Attorney Act9 based on the Uniform Power of Attorney
Act.10 The legislation was sponsored by the State Bar of Texas and
originated in the Real Estate, Probate, and Trust Law Section (REPTL)
of the State Bar.11
The push to amend the Texas Durable Power of Attorney Act came
from the probate side of REPTL based on problems that Texas attorneys
had seen in the use of durable powers of attorney. Texans have “been
unable to effectively use DPOAs due to their rejection for arbitrary or
unexplained reasons.”12 Clients would execute a durable power of attor-
ney as part of an estate plan, but when the agent tried to act on behalf of
the principal, other parties would refuse to deal with the agent, thus ne-
cessitating a guardianship proceeding.
Attorneys on the real estate side of REPTL became involved because a
durable power of attorney may give an agent authority to execute a deed
or other instrument transferring an interest in real estate on behalf of a
principal. Powers of attorney are used in real estate transactions when an
agent is acting on behalf of an elderly or incapacitated principal or more
often for convenience. In either scenario, the Uniform Act and the
amended Texas Act raise interesting questions regarding whether the acts
change common law rules relating to the validity of a deed or other trans-
fer of an interest in real estate by an attorney-in-fact. This article will
address those issues relating to real estate.
Part II of the article examines some of the changes made by the Texas
Legislature when it amended the Durable Power of Attorney Act and by
the Uniform Law Commission when it promulgated the new Uniform
Act. In Part III, the article discusses common law rules relating to defec-
tive deeds, defective powers of attorney, and deeds executed by an agent
under a defective power of attorney. Part IV discusses the effect of the
Uniform Act and the recent amendments to the Durable Power of Attor-
ney Act on the law relating to real estate transactions.
7. Id.
8. Id. § 119 cmt. In fact, 80% of attorneys surveyed reported occasional or even fre-
quent difficulties. Id. (citing Whitton, Survey Results, supra note 5).
9. H.B. 1974, 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 834 (codified in scattered sections of TEX.
EST. CODE ANN. Ch. 751 (West 2017)).
10. See Committee Report Relating to Durable Powers of Attorney, H.B. 1974, 58th
Leg. (Tex. May 28, 2017).
11. The State Bar of Texas supports legislative action in accordance with State Bar
Board Policy 8.01. State Bar sections may propose legislation within their respective areas
to be included within the State Bar’s legislative program. Tex. St. Bar Bd. Policy § 8.01.09
(2017). Professor McKnight worked with the State Bar Family Law Section on numerous
legislative initiatives.
12. Committee Report Relating to Durable Powers of Attorney, H.B. 1974, 58th Leg.
(Tex. May 28, 2017).
372 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
II. UNIFORM AND TEXAS STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Texas Legislature made a number of changes to the Durable Power
of Attorney Act in 2017, but the most important change—the one that is
the subject of this article—is intended to require parties to act reasonably
in accepting a durable power of attorney.13 The legislature added Sub-
chapter E entitled “Acceptance of and Reliance on Durable Power of
Attorney.”14
The Act as amended requires that a party accept a power of attorney
unless one of the enumerated exceptions to the requirement applies.15
The party may require a certification by the agent, an opinion of counsel,
or an English translation before accepting the power of attorney.16 Ex-
ceptions to the requirement that a party accept a power of attorney in-
clude circumstances in which:
1. the party “would not otherwise be required to engage in a trans-
action with the principal under the same circumstances” (if, for
example, the principal would be a new customer);
2. entering into a transaction with the agent would be inconsistent
with a federal or state law or regulation;
3. the party has filed a suspicious activity report for the principal or
agent, believes in good faith that the principal or agent has com-
mitted financial crimes, or has had a previous bad experience
with the agent resulting in litigation or a material loss;
4. the party has actual knowledge that the power of attorney has
been terminated;
5. the agent refused to provide a requested certification, opinion or
translation or, if provided, it is in some way deficient;
6. the party “believes in good faith” that the power of attorney is
not valid or that the agent does not have authority; or
7. the party makes or knows of a report to law enforcement or an-
other governmental agency of the agent’s abuse or exploitation
of the principal.17
The Act provides other exceptions as well.18
If a party refuses to accept a power of attorney under one of the excep-
tions, the party must provide the agent with a written statement of the
reasons for the refusal.19 However, if a party refuses to accept a power of
13. See id.
14. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. Ch. 751, subch. E (West 2017).
15. Id. § 751.201(a)(1). The requirements of the subtitle apply to most durable powers
of attorney. Id. § 751.0015.
16. Id. § 751.201(a)(2); see also §§ 751.203 (agent’s certification), 751.204 (opinion of
counsel), 751.205 (English translation).
17. Id. § 751.206(1)–(6), (9).
18. Id. § 751.206(7)–(8), (10)–(11). These additional exceptions apply if the power of
attorney is the subject of a pending litigation, id. § 751.206(7), if the power of attorney was
found invalid in earlier litigation, id. § 751.206(8), if co-agents give conflicting instructions,
id. § 751.206(10), or if the power of attorney is governed by the law of another state that
would not require its acceptance, id. § 751.206(11).
19. Id. § 751.207. However, if the reason is under § 751.206(2) (inconsistency with law)
or (3) (suspicious activity report), the party does not have to provide additional detail. Id.
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attorney in violation of the Act, the statutory remedy available to the
principal or agent is an order requiring the party to accept the power of
attorney along with an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and court
costs.20
If a party does accept a durable power of attorney in good faith without
actual knowledge that the signature is forged, that the power of attorney
is void, invalid, or terminated, or that the agent has exceeded the author-
ity, the party may rely on the power of attorney as if it is valid and pres-
ently in effect and as if the agent is acting properly.21 Actual knowledge is
defined in the statute as “the knowledge of a person without that person
making any due inquiry, and without any imputed knowledge . . . .”22
Thus, although the Act requires acceptance of a power of attorney absent
an exception to acceptance, it protects a party who accepts the power of
attorney in good faith.
These provisions of the Texas Act are based on Sections 119 and 120 of
the Uniform Power of Attorney Act.23 Like the Texas Act, the Uniform
Act requires that a party accept a power of attorney absent one of the
enumerated exceptions24 but allows the party to require a certification by
the agent, an opinion of counsel, or an English translation.25 And as in
Texas, the Uniform Act allows a party who accepts a power of attorney in
§ 751.207(b). This protects parties who have filed suspicious activity reports because fed-
eral law prohibits parties from disclosing any information about a suspicious activity
report.
20. Id. § 751.212(c). If the written statement is provided after the commencement of
an action, the only remedy is attorney’s fees and court costs. Id. § 751.212(e). If a party
who refused to accept a power of attorney prevails in a suit by the principal or agent, the
court may award the party reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs incurred in defending
the suit. Id. § 751.213.
21. Id. § 751.209. See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of this section.
22. Id. § 751.002(1).
23. See UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT §§ 119, 120 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006).
24. Id. § 120. The exceptions in the Uniform Act are not as extensive as those in the
Texas Act. Compare TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.206 (West 2017), with UNIF. POWER OF
ATT’Y ACT § 120(b). Under the Uniform Act:
A person is not required to accept an acknowledged statutory form power of
attorney if:
(1) the person is not otherwise required to engage in a transaction with the
principal in the same circumstances;
(2) engaging in a transaction with the agent or the principal in the same
circumstances would be inconsistent with federal law;
(3) the person has actual knowledge of the termination of the agent’s au-
thority or of the power of attorney before exercise of the power;
(4) a request for a certification, a translation, or an opinion of counsel
under Section 119(d) is refused;
(5) the person in good faith believes that the power is not valid or that the
agent does not have the authority to perform the act requested . . . ; or
(6) the person makes, or has actual knowledge that another person has
made, a report to the [local adult protective services office] stating a good
faith belief that the principal may be subject to physical or financial abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or abandonment by the agent . . . .
Id.
25. Id. §§ 119(d), 120(a)(2).
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good faith without actual knowledge of a defect to rely on it.26 Similar to
the Texas Act, if a party refuses to accept a power of attorney in violation
of the Uniform Act, the remedy available to the principal or agent is an
order requiring the party to accept the power of attorney along with an
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs.27
These provisions of the Uniform and Texas Acts are intended to ad-
dress the problem of parties refusing to accept a power of attorney. The
Acts require acceptance of a power of attorney absent an exception to
the requirement, but protect parties who accept a power of attorney in
good faith without actual knowledge of a defect. Thus, “[i]n exchange for
mandated acceptance of an agent’s authority, the Act[s] [do] not require
persons that deal with an agent to investigate the agent or the agent’s
actions.”28 Although the Acts have other provisions designed to safe-
guard against abuse,29 they change the balance between the conflicting
policies of encouraging acceptance of powers of attorney and protecting
against elder abuse or other misconduct by an agent.30 In the past, a party
who dealt with an agent had a duty to ascertain the agent’s authority and
assumed the risk if an agent acted without authority.31 Under the Uni-
form and Texas Acts, however, parties dealing with an agent may have
less incentive and less ability to conduct due diligence to determine the
agent’s authority.32 This in turn may increase the likelihood of miscon-
duct by an agent.
In reviewing the Texas bill before its enactment, real estate lawyers
raised concerns about how the Act would affect buyers and sellers of in-
terests in real estate, mortgage lenders, and title companies.33 In particu-
lar, a question arose as to how the Texas Act would affect the validity of a
26. Id. § 119(b), (c). The Act provides alternate sections, one applicable to all ac-
knowledged powers of attorney and the other applicable only to acknowledged powers of
attorney in the statutory form. Id. § 120(a), alt. A, B.
27. Id. § 120(c).
28. Id. at 2, pref. note. See also TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.002(1) (West 2017) (defin-
ing actual knowledge to exclude any requirement of due inquiry).
29. See UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT at 2, pref. note (The Uniform Act has “safe-
guards against abuse . . . provided through heightened requirements for granting authority
that could dissipate the principal’s property or alter the principal’s estate plan (Section
201(a)), provisions that set out the agent’s duties and liabilities (Sections 114 and 117) and
by specification of the categories of persons that have standing to request judicial review of
the agent’s conduct (Section 116).”); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 751.031(b) (requiring an
express grant of authority to exercise so-called “hot powers” such as making a gift or
changing a beneficiary designation), 751.121–122 (imposing new duties on an agent),
751.251 (listing parties with standing to request review of the agent’s conduct).
30. See Craft, supra note 4, at 432–38; Andrew H. Hook & Lisa V. Johnson, The Vir-
ginia Uniform Power of Attorney Act, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 107, 127–32 (2009); Jennifer L.
Rhein, No One in Charge: Durable Powers of Attorney and the Failure to Protect Incapaci-
tated Principals, 17 ELDER L.J. 165, 180–82 (2009); Whitton, Striking a Balance, supra note
5, at 343.
31. See Jarvis v. Parnell, 167 S.E.2d 3, 6 (N.C. App. 1969); Kern v. J.L. Barksdale
Furniture Corp., 299 S.E.2d 365, 367 (Va. 1983).
32. See infra Part IV.C.2.
33. In response to some of these concerns, drafters added a provision to the bill, which
was included in the final Texas Act. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.007(2) (West 2017). See
infra Part IV.C.1.
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deed or other conveyance of an interest in real estate executed by an
agent without authority to make the conveyance. In order to explain the
questions that the Act raises in real estate transactions, this article will
first discuss common law regarding defective deeds, defective powers of




Many factors in the drafting or execution of a deed can cause the deed
to be defective. For example, a deed that is forged or altered is defec-
tive,34 as is a deed that is not delivered.35 Other defective deeds include
those obtained by fraud, undue influence, or duress, and deeds executed
by a grantor who is incompetent, incapacitated, or a minor.36
The validity of a defective deed depends upon the defect and the cir-
cumstances. Deeds with minor inadvertent errors, such as mistakes in the
property description, can be corrected by the parties37 or reformed by a
court.38 However, in other cases, the defect may be caused by a wrong-
doer. The grantee may be the wrongdoer seeking to take title to prop-
erty—for example, if a grantee fraudulently induces the transfer, exerts
undue influence on the grantor, or forges the deed. In other circum-
stances, the grantee may be an innocent party, or a wrongdoing grantee
may have transferred the property to a good faith purchaser. In litigation
between a grantor and a good faith purchaser from the original grantee,
one will be awarded the property and the other will be left with a cause of
action against the wrongdoer, who may be missing or judgment-proof.
The result in this type of dispute depends upon whether the defect makes
the deed void or voidable.39
A void deed is one that passes no title whatsoever to the grantee.40
34. Forgery is the making or alteration of an instrument “by one who purports to act
as another.” Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 925–26 (Tex. 1976). Thus, the term forgery
includes alteration.
35. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
37. Myrad Props., Inc. v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 300 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. 2009)
(citing Doty v. Barnard, 47 S.W. 712, 713 (Tex. 1898)) (“[A] correction deed may be used
to correct a defective description of a single property when a deed recites inaccurate metes
and bounds.”). See also Gallups v. Kent, 953 So. 2d 393, 394 (Ala. 2006); Beckius v. Hahn,
207 N.W. 515, 517 (Neb. 1926); Johnson v. Hovland, 795 N.W.2d 294, 301 (N.D. 2011).
38. See Dixon v. Dixon, 898 N.W.2d 706, 712 (N.D. 2017); Nelson v. Daugherty, 357
P.2d 425, 432 (Okla. 1960); Simpson v. Curtis, 351 S.W.3d 374, 377–78 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2010, no pet.).
39. The rules relating to void and voidable deeds also apply to other transfers of an
interest in real estate. They are similar to rules relating to contracts in general. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 & cmts. a & b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (differenti-
ating void and voidable contracts and listing circumstances that typically make a contract
voidable).
40. See Slaughter v. Qualls, 162 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. 1942); Kline v. Mueller, 276 P.
200, 206 (Okla. 1928).
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Thus, even a good faith purchaser from the grantee will lose in a suit over
title as between the good faith purchaser and the original owner.41 The
result is that the grantor still has title to the land that the deed purported
to convey.
A voidable deed on the other hand is valid until it is set aside.42 As
between the grantor and grantee, the grantor has the right to ask a court
to void the deed. However, if the grantee in the meantime has transferred
the property to a good faith purchaser, the good faith purchaser gets title
through the voidable deed in the chain of title.43 Thus, in a suit over title
to the property between the original grantor and the good faith pur-
chaser, the good faith purchaser will prevail.
Defects that make a deed voidable include fraud,44 undue influence,45
duress,46 incompetence,47 incapacity,48 and infancy.49 For example, if a
grantee makes misrepresentations in order to procure a deed, the deed
will be voidable due to fraud in the inducement.50
41. See Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf v. Texas Bank, 889 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Graves v. Wayman, 859 N.W.2d 791, 801
(Minn. 2015); Kline, 276 P. at 206.
42. Logue v. Von Almen, 40 N.E.2d 73, 81-82 (Ill. 1941); Lighthouse Church of Clover-
leaf, 889 S.W.2d at 601.
43. Logue, 40 N.E.2d at 82; Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf, 889 S.W.2d at 601.
44. Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007); Nobles v. Mar-
cus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 925–26 (Tex. 1976); Morlock, L.L.C. v. Bank of New York, 448 S.W.3d
514, 519 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2014, no pet.). See also Fishman v. Murphy, 72
A.3d 185, 193 (Md. 2013).
45. McCary v. Robinson, 130 So. 2d 25, 29 (Ala. 1961); Rentfro v. Cavazos, 2012 WL
566364, at *10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied); First Interstate Bank v. First
Wyo. Bank, N.A., 762 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 1988).
46. See Kline v. Kline, 128 P. 805, 809 (Ariz. 1912); Lyon v. Bargiol, 47 S.E.2d 625, 628
(S.C. 1948); Cook v. Moore, 39 Tex. 255, 255 (1873); Dyer v. Dyer, 616 S.W.2d 663, 665
(Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism’d).
47. See Salliotte v. Dollarhite, 178 N.W. 694, 695 (Mich. 1920); Scott v. Swank, 273
N.W. 25, 29 (Neb. 1937); Gaston v. Copeland, 335 S.W.2d 406, 408–09 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Amarillo 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Parties often allege more than one defect. See, e.g.,
Kramer v. Leinbaugh, 259 N.W. 20, 21 (Iowa 1935) (fraud, incompetence, and undue
influence).
48. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. Tit. 2, App., § 10.20, cmt. (West Supp. 2017) (citing
Williams v. Sapieha, 61 S.W. 115, 116 (Tex.1901)); Williamson v. Lowe, 241 S.W. 333, 335
(Ky. 1922); Bragdon v. Drew, 658 A.2d 666, 668 (Me. 1995). Incompetence is one type in
incapacity. Modern courts tend to use the term incapacity. See infra note 71 (discussing the
term “incapacitated person”).
49. See City of Jackson v. Jordan, 202 So. 3d 199, 203 (Miss. 2016); Lewis v. Stephens,
362 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Mo. 1962); Holden v. Murphy, 62 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Texarkana 1933, writ ref’d) (citing Askey v. Williams, 11 S. W. 1101 (Tex. 1889)). See also
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. Tit. 2, App., § 10.10, cmt. (West 2009) (“[D]eeds executed by mi-
nors are voidable, not void, and convey title until set aside.”).
50. See Spikes v. Clark, 411 S.W.2d 148, 152–53 (Mo. 1967); Ford v. Exxon Mobil
Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007); Jones v. Comer, 13 S.E.2d 578, 582 (W. Va.
1941).
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A forged deed is void51 as is a deed that is not delivered.52 Such deeds
have no effect. In addition, deeds obtained by fraud in the factum are
treated as void in many jurisdictions.53 Fraud in the factum is fraud by
which a grantee tricks a grantor into signing an instrument without the
grantor knowing the nature of the instrument.54 Most cases in which a
court voids a deed based on fraud in the factum involve an elderly, illiter-
ate, or disabled grantor.55
Texas courts have discussed fraud in the factum in contexts other than
deeds, distinguishing fraud in the factum, which makes an agreement
void, from fraud in the inducement, which makes it merely voidable.56
Texas courts have not used the term “fraud in the factum” in the context
of a deed, but they have applied the concept to declare a deed void.
For example, in Stephenson v. Arceneaux,57 a grantee fraudulently mis-
represented the contents of a deed to two grantors, one of whom did not
speak English. The grantors relied on the representation of the grantee
that the document was an oil and mineral lease when in fact it was a deed.
A court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which
had concluded that the deed was null and void and was never a binding
document upon the grantors.58
In Reyes v. De la Fuente,59 an illiterate grantor was entitled to cancella-
tion of a deed after the grantee obtained the deed under the false pre-
tense that it was a mortgage. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court, which had declared the deed null and
void.60 Thus, Texas courts seem to have applied the doctrine that fraud in
51. OC Interior Servs., LLC v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 7 Cal. App. 5th 1318, 1331–32
(Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2017); Smith v. Smith, 438 A.2d 842, 843 (Conn. 1981); Faison v. Lewis,
32 N.E.3d 400, 403 (N.Y. 2015); Hennessy v. Blair, 173 S.W. 871, 874 (Tex. 1915); Dyson
Descendant Corp. v. Sonat Exploration Co., 861 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1993, writ refused n.r.e.); Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50, 52–53 (Utah 1978).
52. See Smith v. Lockridge, 702 S.E.2d 858, 862 (Ga. 2010); Seay v. Seay (In re Estate
of Hardy), 910 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Miss. 2005); Estes v. Reding, 398 S.W.2d 148, 149–50
(Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1965, writ refused n.r.e.).
53. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 817 (3d ed. West 2000). See, e.g.,
Delsas v. Centex Home Equity Co., LLC, 186 P.3d 141, 144 (Colo. App. 2008); Chen v.
Bell-Smith, 768 F. Supp. 2d 121, 135 (D.D.C. 2011).
54. See Langley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 484 U.S. 86, 93 (1987); Bellamy v. Reso-
lution Trust Corp., 469 S.E.2d 182, 184 (Ga. 1996); FDIC v. Jahner, 506 N.W.2d 57, 61
(N.D. 1993).
55. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 53, at 817. See, e.g., Mangum v. Surles, 187
S.E.2d 697, 700 (N.C. 1972); McNac v. Brown, 208 P. 268, 270 (Okla. 1922).
56. See, e.g., Dewey v. Wegner, 138 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, pet. denied); Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 889 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (citing Langley v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
484 U.S. 86, 93–94 (1987).
57. Stephenson v. Arceneaux, 227 S.W. 729 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1920, no
writ).
58. Id. at 731.
59. Reyes v. De La Fuente, 15 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1929, writ
dism’d w.o.j.).
60. Id. at 703.
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the factum makes a deed void.61 Courts in other jurisdictions are more
explicit in holding a deed void due to fraud in the factum.62
The distinction between a void deed and a voidable deed arises in the
treatment of a good faith purchaser from the grantee.63 A deed that is
forged or undelivered is void and wholly ineffective to pass title.64 Both
the grantor and a good faith purchaser from the grantee are innocent
parties, but the grantor wins. A purchaser can obtain title insurance to
protect against the risk that a deed in her chain of title is void but will
likely receive only damages under the terms of the policy. Voidable deeds
are treated differently. As between a grantor who is fraudulently induced
to sign a deed or lacks capacity and a good faith purchaser from the
grantee, the law favors the good faith purchaser as more innocent. The
grantor’s cause of action is against the wrongdoer.
B. DEEDS EXECUTED UNDER DEFECTIVE POWER OF ATTORNEY
Similar to the rules governing deeds65 and contracts,66 a defective
power of attorney can be void or voidable depending upon the circum-
stances. A forged power of attorney is void,67 and a power of attorney
becomes void at the death of the principal68 or upon revocation.69 Powers
of attorney that are voidable include those obtained by fraud,70 those ex-
61. See also Tijerina v. Tijerina, 290 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio
1956, no writ) (involving an illiterate grantor) (“This is not a case ‘where the grantor knew
the contents of the deed he executed, but was induced to execute it by the fraudulent
representations of the grantee or of someone in privity with the grantee * * *.’ [16 Am. Jur.
20, Deeds, § 31 (2017); U. S. Royalty Ass’n Stiles, 131 S.W.2d 1060 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Amarillo 1939, writ dism’d)]. This is a case where the plaintiff signed a deed under the
fraudulently induced belief that it was a mere power of attorney.”).
62. See, e.g. Delsas v. Centex Home Equity Co., LLC, 186 P.3d 141, 144 (Colo. App.
2008); Williams v. Mentore, 115 A.D.3d 664, 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
63. Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf v. Texas Bank, 889 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994). See also Bardin v. Grace, 52 So. 425, 426 (Ala. 1910); Bank of
America v. Adamson, 391 P.3d 196, 203 (Utah 2017).
64. And courts in many jurisdictions treat cases involving fraud in the factum like the
cases of forgery or non-delivery. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
65. See supra Part III.A.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 & cmts. a & b (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (differentiating void and voidable contracts and listing circumstances that typically
make a contract voidable). “The legal relations that exist after avoidance vary with the
circumstances. In some cases the party who avoids the contract is entitled to be restored to
a position as good as that which he occupied immediately before the formation of the
contract; in other cases the parties may be left in the same condition as at the time of the
avoidance.” Id. § 7 cmt. c.
67. See Neuman v. Neumann, 971 N.Y.S.2d 322, 323–24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). See
also Ruiz v. Stewart Mineral Corp., 202 S.W.3d 242, 248–49 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, pet.
denied) (defendant alleged that power of attorney was forged, but court found no evidence
to support the allegation).
68. Long v. Schull, 439 A.2d 975, 977 (Conn. 1981); Dallam v. Sanchez, 47 So. 871, 871
(Fla. 1908); Wall v. Lubbock, 118 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1908, writ ref’d).
69. Scroggins v. Meredith, 131 S.W.2d 195, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1939, no
writ); Lazov v. Black, 567 P.2d 233, 234–35 (Wash. 1977).
70. Dybvik v. Behrends, 8 Alaska 544, 546 (D. Alaska 1935). See also Broadway v.
Miller, 288 S.W. 627 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1926, writ ref’d).
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ecuted by a party who is incompetent or incapacitated,71 and those exe-
cuted by a minor.72 Courts in some jurisdictions, however, hold that a
power of attorney executed by an incompetent person is void.73
The capacity of an agent to act depends upon the capacity of the princi-
pal.74 Thus, an act by an agent is void if the power of attorney is void, and
an act by an agent is voidable if the power of attorney is voidable.
What if a deed is executed by an agent under a defective power of
attorney? The Texas Supreme Court held in Williams v. Sapieha that
there is “no difference in principle between the act of making a deed
which passes the title and making an instrument which authorizes another
person to do the same thing.”75 In that case, a landowner signed a power
of attorney authorizing his attorney-in-fact to execute a deed on his be-
half; however, the landowner lacked mental capacity at the time he exe-
cuted the power of attorney.76 The Court held that both the power of
attorney and deed were voidable, rather than void.77
In Ferguson v. Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co.,78 the plaintiff
executed a power of attorney to his brother when he was twenty, and the
71. See Parrish v. Rigell, 188 S.E. 15, 19 (Ga. 1936) (“When a power of attorney is
executed by one insane at the time, it is voidable.”); O’Neal by and through Small v.
O’Neal, 803 S.E.2d 184, 188 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (“[W]hen a mentally incompetent person
executes a contract or deed before their condition has been formally declared, the resulting
agreement or transaction is voidable and not void.”); Williams v. Sapieha, 61 S.W. 115, 116
(Tex. 1901); Houston Oil Co. v. Biskamp, 99 S.W.2d 1007, 1010 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beau-
mont 1936, writ dism’d).
Courts use the term “incompetence” as well as “incapacity” or “lack of capacity” in
cases where a party does not have mental capacity. The Texas Estates Code defines an
“incapacitated person” as:
(1) a minor;
(2) an adult who, because of a physical or mental condition, is substantially
unable to:
(A) provide food, clothing, or shelter for himself or herself;
(B) care for the person’s own physical health; or
(C) manage the person’s own financial affairs; or
(3) a person who must have a guardian appointed for the person to receive
funds due the person from a governmental source.
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1002.017 (West 2014). Thus, incapacity is a more general term
including infancy as well.
72. Nettleton v. Morrison, 18 F. Cas. 14, 15 (C.C.D. Minn. 1877); Ferguson v. Houston,
E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co., 11 S.W. 347 (Tex. 1889). But see Philpot v. Bingham, 55 Ala. 435, 439
(1876) (holding a power of attorney executed by a minor to be void).
73. See Williams, 61 S.W. at 118; O’Neal by and through Small v. O’Neal, 803 S.E.2d at
188 (“[A] contract or deed executed after a person has been adjudicated incompetent is
absolutely void . . . .”).
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(1) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
“Capacity to do an act through an agent is characterized as ‘coextensive’ with legal capac-
ity to do the act oneself . . . .” Id. cmt. b (citing FRANCIS M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD &
REYNOLDS ON AGENCY 34 (17th ed. 2001)).
Note that a durable power of attorney creates an exception to this general rule because
the authority granted the agent continues despite the principal’s subsequent incapacity. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
75. Williams, 61 S.W. at 116.
76. Id. at 117.
77. Id.
78. Ferguson, 11 S.W. at 347.
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brother, pursuant to the power of attorney, sold land in which the plain-
tiff held an interest as tenant in common. The purchaser was not aware
that the plaintiff was a minor, and the plaintiff received his share of the
sale proceeds. More than two years after reaching the age of majority, the
plaintiff sued to set aside the sale without offering to return the purchase
price. The Texas Supreme Court held the power of attorney voidable, but
affirmed the trial court’s holding denying relief on the ground that the
plaintiff, in order to set aside the sale, should have acted within a reason-
able time and offered the return of the purchase money.79
The Texas Court of Appeals recently followed the reasoning of Wil-
liams to declare a deed voidable. In Cole v. McWillie,80 the court ex-
amined the issue of whether a deed is void or voidable when executed by
an attorney-in-fact who was acting on behalf of an individual who was
competent at the time of the execution of the power of attorney but was
incompetent at the time of the execution of the deed. Because the power
of attorney was not a durable power of attorney, the subsequent incom-
petence of the principal rendered the power of attorney voidable. The
court concluded that Williams was controlling and held that the deed was
voidable.81 The court further ruled that any action to disavow the deed
was subject to a four-year statute of limitations.
In these cases, the courts treat the deed executed by an agent as being
in the same category as the power of attorney. If the power of attorney is
voidable, then the deed is voidable.82 If the power of attorney is void,
then the deed would also be void.83 If void, the deed is of no effect, and
the grantor will win as against a grantee and a good faith purchaser from
the grantee. If voidable, the grantor will win as against the grantee, even
if the grantee purchased in good faith from the grantor’s agent. Only a
good faith purchaser from the grantee can prevail over the grantor. Thus,
in the case of a voidable power of attorney and deed, the good faith of
the grantee in dealing with an agent would be irrelevant. But both the
Uniform Power of Attorney Act and the Texas Durable Power of Attor-
ney Act might arguably change some of these common law rules.
IV. UNIFORM ACT AND TEXAS DURABLE POWER OF
ATTORNEY ACT AMENDMENTS APPLICATION TO
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
A. RELIANCE ON A POWER OF ATTORNEY
The Uniform and Texas Acts impose an obligation on parties to accept
79. Id. at 348–49.
80. Cole v. McWillie, 464 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. denied).
81. Id. at 902.
82. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
83. See Neuman v. Neumann, 971 N.Y.S.2d 322, 323–24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). See
also Ruiz v. Stewart Mineral Corp., 202 S.W.3d 242, 248–49 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, rev.
denied) (defendant alleged that power of attorney was forged, but court found no evidence
to support the allegation).
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powers of attorney,84 but provide that a party who accepts a power of
attorney “in good faith” “without . . . actual knowledge” of a defect, “may
rely” on the power of attorney as if it is genuine, valid, and still in effect.85
It is not clear what the statute means in allowing a party to “rely” on the
power of attorney. The language raises the question of whether that reli-
ance could in some way give validity to a deed that would otherwise be
void or voidable under common law.
The reliance language in the Texas Act is based on Section 119 of the
Uniform Act.86 The Prefatory Note to the Act states: “Section 119 pro-
vides protection from liability for persons that in good faith accept an
acknowledged power of attorney.”87 This implies that the section merely
protects against liability and could not make a defective deed valid by
validating otherwise invalid acts of an agent. However, the comment to
Section 119 provides that “the Act places the risk that a power of attor-
ney is invalid upon the principal rather than the person that accepts the
power of attorney.”88 This comment, carried to an extreme, could imply
that the section does validate a defective deed, transferring title in order
to place the risk of loss on the principal rather than on the party who
accepts a power of attorney and a deed executed by an agent thereunder.
The Act does not otherwise shed any light on what it means to say that a
party “may rely.” Parties involved in drafting the Uniform Act said that
reliance was discussed in the context of protecting the party who accepts
a power of attorney from liability and that the issue of the validity of a
deed executed under a defective power of attorney was not considered.89
The Uniform Power of Attorney Act has been adopted in more than
twenty states,90 and at least two states have made substantive modifica-
tions to Section 119 to clarify its meaning. The Alabama legislature
changed the language to provide that a party who “effects a transaction in
reliance upon” a power of attorney without actual knowledge of a defect
“is fully exonerated from any liability for effecting the transaction in reli-
84. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 120 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016); TEX. EST. CODE
ANN. § 751.201(a)(1) (West 2017).
85. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 119(b), (c); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.209 (West
2017).
86. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 119(b), (c). Subsection (c) provides: “A person that
in good faith accepts an acknowledged power of attorney without actual knowledge that
the power of attorney is void, invalid, or terminated, that the purported agent’s authority is
void, invalid, or terminated, or that the agent is exceeding or improperly exercising the
agent’s authority may rely upon the power of attorney as if the power of attorney were
genuine, valid and still in effect, the agent’s authority were genuine, valid and still in effect,
and the agent had not exceeded and had properly exercised the authority.” Subsection (b)
has similar language with regard to the genuineness of the signature.
87. Id. at 2, pref. note (emphasis added).
88. Id. § 119 cmt.
89. Telephone interviews with Benjamin Orzeske, Chief Counsel, Uniform Law
Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2017) and Linda Whitton, Reporter for the Unif. Power of Att’y Act
(Nov. 2, 2017).
90. See Power of Attorney, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N (Sept. 28, 2017), http://
www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=power%20of%20Attorney [https://perma.cc/EQB8-
5C89].
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ance on the power of attorney . . . .”91 A comment states: “Alabama de-
termined that this change more clearly expressed the intent of Section
119.”92
Pennsylvania revised the language to provide that “[a] person who in
good faith accepts a power of attorney without actual knowledge of [a
defect] may, without liability, rely upon the power of attorney . . . .”93 The
comment provides that the section “is designed to encourage third parties
to follow the instructions of an attorney-in-fact and to be relieved of lia-
bility for doing so.”94 In both Alabama and Pennsylvania, the revisions to
the Uniform Act make clear that the party’s reliance merely protects the
party from liability rather than validating the acts of an agent under a
defective power of attorney. For the reasons discussed below, the reliance
provisions of the Texas and Uniform Acts should be limited to protecting
a party from liability to the principal.95
To further explore the interpretation of Section 119 of the Uniform
Act, it is useful to consider different scenarios in which a power of attor-
ney is presented. Much of the discussion of the Act relates to banking
transactions, as opposed to real estate transactions, so we will first con-
sider the application of the Act to banking transactions.
B. BANKING TRANSACTIONS
Provisions of the Uniform and Texas Acts seem to work as intended in
the context of banking transactions. A bank may be required to accept a
durable power of attorney when an agent withdraws the principal’s funds
or removes items from the principal’s safe deposit box, and the bank is
then protected against liability to the principal if the power of attorney is
later determined to be defective or the agent is otherwise acting without
authority. Thus, although banks are required to accept durable powers of
attorney, they are protected against liability as long as they act in good
faith without actual knowledge of a defect. The Texas statute in particular
has a number of provisions negotiated by representatives of the banking
community to protect banks presented with a power of attorney.96
One consequence of the Uniform Act is that it may discourage banks
from investigating abuse by an agent. However, in Texas, banks and other
financial institutions have an obligation to report suspected financial ex-
ploitation of a vulnerable adult.97 Thus, banks cannot blindly accept a
power of attorney and rely on the statutory protection against liability if a
91. ALA. CODE § 26-1A-119(b), (c) (West 2015).
92. Id. § 26-1A-119 cmt.
93. TIT. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5608(c), (d) (West 2014).
94. Id. § 5608 cmt.
95. See infra Part IV.C.
96. For example, banks are not required to list the specific reason for rejecting a
power of attorney when the reason is that the bank has filed a suspicious activity report
and is prohibited by law from disclosing the report even to a judge. See TEX. EST. CODE
ANN. § 751.207(b) (West 2017).
97. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 280.002 (West 2017); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 48.051(a) (West 2015).
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bank employee suspects financial abuse. If a bank has reported suspected
financial exploitation, the bank is not required to accept a power of attor-
ney from the suspect agent.98
C. REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
The statutory provisions raise different issues in the context of a real
estate transaction. If a purchaser of real estate and the purchaser’s title
company accept a power of attorney in good faith without actual knowl-
edge of a defect, what does it mean to say that they are entitled to rely on
the power of attorney as if it is valid? The purchaser and title company
are protected against liability to the principal for entering into the trans-
action. But could the provision potentially validate an otherwise void or
voidable deed?
1. Void Powers of Attorney
The Texas Durable Power of Attorney Act includes a provision to
make it clear that a void deed is still void. It provides that the Act does
not validate a conveyance if it is executed by an agent under a void power
of attorney.99 Thus, if a power of attorney is forged and a grantee accepts
a deed delivered by the “agent” under that power of attorney, then the
grantee’s good faith in dealing with the agent will not in any way validate
the deed. This is the best result because the grantee can purchase title
insurance to protect against the risk of a forged power of attorney.100 The
grantor, an innocent party, retains title to the property.101 A good faith
grantee has a claim under the grantee’s title policy. The title company is
subrogated to any claim that the grantee may have against the agent or
other wrongdoer. And, of course, title companies collect premiums to off-
set their losses resulting from payment of claims.
In Texas, a deed executed by an “agent” under a void power of attor-
ney is clearly void. Courts in both Alabama and Pennsylvania would
reach the same result because of their modifications to the Uniform
Act.102 The Uniform Act does not have any specific provision regarding
the effect of a conveyance executed by an agent under a void power of
attorney, nor does it define or modify the reliance language. The Act
does, however, provide that “[u]nless displaced by a provision of [the
Act], principles of law and equity supplement [the Act].”103 Thus, a court
could reasonably find that the common law rule that a deed is void if
executed by an “agent” under a forged or otherwise void power of attor-
98. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.206(9) (West 2017).
99. Id. § 751.007(b).
100. Title insurance protects a grantee if a deed is forged or otherwise void. See
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 53, § 11.14, at 917.
101. A grantor has no means to protect against a forged deed or forged power of attor-
ney. The grantor’s title policy would not cover such an event, which is subsequent to the
policy. See id. at 918.
102. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
103. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 121.
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ney is not displaced by the language of the Act that allows a party to rely
on a power of attorney. This result is supported by the prefatory note to
the Uniform Act.104
The better result keeps the risk of a forged or otherwise void power of
attorney on the grantee (or the grantee’s title company) where it falls
under common law rules. However, the acceptance requirements of the
Uniform and Texas Acts could potentially obligate a purchaser and title
company to accept a void power of attorney.
2. The Obligation to Accept a Power of Attorney
In the past, title companies and purchasers could question the validity
of a power of attorney and refuse to accept it. Title companies could
serve as the watchdog against fraudulent transactions by a purported
agent and would often require that a power of attorney specifically au-
thorize the transaction being insured. Title companies could exercise due
diligence to provide protection against misconduct by an agent, but they
could also delay a transaction with an honest agent trying to sell a prop-
erty for an elderly relative.
A title company or purchaser may no longer require a particular form
of power of attorney or require that it specifically authorize the transac-
tion absent an exception to the acceptance requirement. However, pur-
chasers and title companies can ask for the agent’s certification and for an
opinion of an attorney. Furthermore, a purchaser may refuse to enter into
a transaction and the title company may refuse to insure the transaction if
it fits within one of the exceptions to the requirement of accepting a
power of attorney. The first exception would permit a title company or
purchaser to refuse to accept a power of attorney if the title company or
purchaser “would not otherwise be required to engage in a transaction
with the principal under the same circumstances.”105 They may also re-
fuse to accept a power of attorney if they believe in good faith that the
power of attorney is not valid or that the agent does not have
authority.106
The application of the first exception to the acceptance requirement in
the context of a real estate transaction requires more discussion. Because
of this exception, a purchaser’s or title company’s obligation to accept a
power of attorney would depend in part on the stage of the transaction
when the power of attorney is presented. If an agent under a power of
attorney is acting for the seller in negotiating and executing a contract of
sale, then a prospective purchaser, who has no obligation to purchase any
particular property, also has no obligation to work with an agent who is
selling property on behalf of a principal. In addition, a title company
would have no obligation to issue a title commitment to a new customer.
On the other hand, if a purchaser is already obligated to purchase prop-
104. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
105. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.206(1) (West 2017).
106. Id. § 751.206(6).
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erty under a contract of sale executed by the seller and purchaser, the
purchaser may be obligated to accept a deed to the property executed by
the seller’s agent absent another exception to the acceptance require-
ment. Similarly, if a title company has already issued a title commitment
to a purchaser, the title company may be obligated to accept a deed to the
property executed by the seller’s agent and insure the purchaser’s title
absent some other exception to the acceptance requirement.
Interestingly, when the power of attorney is presented after execution
of the contract of sale, it is more likely a power of attorney for conve-
nience rather than one intended as an estate planning tool. Thus, it is not
likely to be the circumstance in which the Uniform and Texas Acts are
intended to encourage acceptance of a power of attorney. Conversely, if
the agent is involved in the negotiation of the contract of sale, the power
of attorney is more likely one that was executed at an earlier date in
contemplation of the possibility of incapacity. These issues regarding the
acceptance requirement arise when a power of attorney is determined to
be voidable as well as void.
3. Voidable Powers of Attorney
What is the result if a conveyance is executed by an agent under a
power of attorney that is voidable rather than void? Neither the Texas
nor the Uniform Act directly addresses this scenario. Section 751.209 of
the Texas Act and Section 119(c) of the Uniform Act refer to powers of
attorney that are void, invalid, or terminated,107 but do not include the
term “voidable.” A grantee who accepts a voidable power of attorney in
good faith without notice may argue that she is entitled to rely on the
agent’s authority under these provisions. This right to rely may simply
protect the grantee from liability, but it might arguably validate the void-
able deed. To explore which is the better result, it is helpful to consider
some hypothetical situations.
First assume that A1, a fraudster, makes fraudulent representations to
an elderly homeowner, O1, to induce her to execute a durable power of
attorney making A1 her agent and giving him very broad authority, in-
cluding the authority to transfer real estate on her behalf. A few days
later, A1 executes a deed as agent for O1 transferring title to a grantee,
G1, who pays the purchase price to A1. G1 does no due diligence to de-
termine the validity of the power of attorney, but he has no actual knowl-
edge of A1’s fraud. O1 is in possession of the home when the deed is
delivered. A1 takes the money and leaves town. G1 sues O1 for posses-
sion of the home.
Under common law, the power of attorney and deed would be found
voidable, and a court could set aside the sale.108 O1 would retain title to
the property, and G1 would have a cause of action against A1. G1 might
107. UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 119(c); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.209(b) (West
2017).
108. See supra notes 70 and 82 and accompanying text.
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argue pursuant to Section 119(c) of the Uniform Act or Section
751.209(b) of the Texas Act that because he is entitled to rely on the
power of attorney, the deed is valid to transfer title. O1 would argue that
the statute only protects G1 from liability to O1 for accepting the power
of attorney. O1 may also argue that G1 did not accept the power of attor-
ney in good faith because the purchase price was going to A1 rather than
O1.
This hypothetical illustrates some of the weaknesses of the Uniform
and Texas Acts in the context of a real estate transaction. The Acts allow
a party without actual notice of a defect to rely on the power of attorney.
Under real estate law, a party’s possession gives inquiry notice of the
party’s interest in the property so that a purchaser is deemed to have
notice of the interest of the party in possession.109 However, the Acts
require no investigation on the part of a purchaser to determine the valid-
ity of the power of attorney.110 Further, the Acts fail to take account of
the fact that G1 can protect himself with the purchase of title insurance.
Now assume that an elderly homeowner, O2, has a will leaving her
house to her son and other property to her daughter. O2 executes a dura-
ble power of attorney to her daughter, A2, giving her very broad author-
ity, including the authority to transfer real estate. After O2 moves to an
assisted living center, A2 enters into a contract with G2 to sell O2’s home.
G2 and G2’s title company ask for and receive A2’s certification regard-
ing the power of attorney and an attorney’s opinion as to its validity. The
sale closes and sale proceeds go into O2’s bank account, which A2 uses to
pay for O2’s assisted living. After G2 moves into the home, O2 dies and
O2’s son brings suit to set aside the deed, arguing undue influence and
that O2 was not mentally competent at the time of execution of the
power of attorney. If a jury agrees that O2 was incapacitated at the time
of execution of the power of attorney, then under common law both the
power of attorney and deed are voidable.111
Under common law, the court could set aside the sale,112 returning the
home to O2’s estate and leaving G2 a claim under G2’s title policy. Or
the court might find that O2’s son is estopped from setting aside the deed
if he failed to act within a reasonable time.113 G2 might also argue, pursu-
ant to Section 119(c) of the Uniform Act or Section 751.209(b) of the
109. See Martinez v. Affordable Hous. Network, Inc., 123 P.3d 1201, 1207 (Colo. 2005);
EDWARD E. CHASE & JULIA PATTERSON FORRESTER, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERI-
ALS, AND QUESTIONS 642 (LEXISNEXIS 2010); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 53, at
885.
110. See UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 119 cmt. (“[A] person is not required to investi-
gate whether a power of attorney is valid. . . .”); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.002(1) (West
2017) (Actual knowledge is defined as being knowledge without “any due inquiry, and
without any imputed knowledge.”).
111. See supra notes 71 and 82 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. G2’s title company in defending the suit
should argue that sale proceeds must be returned in order for the court to set aside the
sale.
113. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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Texas Act, that he is entitled to rely on the power of attorney, and that
the statute means that the power of attorney and the deed are valid. If
that argument were successful, G2 could keep the house and O2’s chil-
dren could argue over any remaining sale proceeds. O2’s son could also
argue that the statute only protects G2 from liability for accepting the
power of attorney.
This hypothetical shows that in some circumstances the equities may
favor a good faith grantee over the principal. If the Acts are designed to
place the risk of loss on the principal rather than on parties who deal with
an agent, then giving title to the grantee does so. But the common law
can be applied with more flexibility. Courts sometimes use equitable prin-
ciples to reach the desired result,114 which in this hypothetical could give
title to the grantee based on an estoppel argument.
These hypotheticals illustrate the many factors involved in determining
who should be awarded title to the property in these types of disputes.
One such factor is the relative fault or contribution of the principal and
the grantee to the problem that made the power of attorney defective.
Common law rules governing the validity of deeds consider the relative
fault of the parties, but leave title in the grantor if both parties are inno-
cent.115 Another factor is imputed knowledge from inquiry notice. The
Uniform and Texas Acts do not impute any knowledge of a defect, but
longstanding property rules impose a duty on a purchaser to ask reasona-
ble questions based on parties in possession of property or other factors
visible on the property.116
Another relevant consideration is the availability of title insurance. A
grantee can purchase title insurance to protect against the risk of a defec-
tive deed caused by an invalid power of attorney. A principal cannot
purchase insurance to protect against events occurring after the issuance
of the policy. Title companies formerly served as the watchdog in
preventing fraudulent transactions. We want title companies to continue
to exercise due diligence while balancing the competing policy of encour-
aging parties to accept powers of attorney. The relative weight of these
factors depends in part on whether a power of attorney is being used
merely for the convenience of the parties or as an estate planning tool.
V. CONCLUSION
Durable powers of attorney are intended to allow individuals to plan
for the possibility of becoming incapacitated and, thus, to avoid an expen-
sive guardianship. The Uniform Act and the Texas Durable Power of At-
torney Act are designed to require parties to be reasonable in the
114. See, e.g., Link v. Page, 10 S.W. 699 (Tex. 1889) (estoppel); Ferguson v. Houston,
East & West Texas Ry. Co., 11 S.W. 347 (Tex. 1898) (failure to act within a reasonable
time).
115. See Methonen v. Stone, 941 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Alaska 1997); CHASE & FORRESTER,
supra note 109, at 642; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 53, at 817 n.72, 818.
116. Id. 882–83.
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acceptance of powers of attorney. However, the Acts are not clear as to
how they should be applied in the case of real estate transactions. Addi-
tional legislation would be helpful to clarify the application of the Acts
and to make them more compatible with solving the problems that may
arise in the context of real estate transactions.117
Considerations in designing a statutory scheme should include the rela-
tive fault or contribution of the parties in creating the defect in the power
of attorney, the availability of title insurance to cover losses, the real
property concept of inquiry notice, the reason for the use of a power of
attorney (for convenience or because the principal is incapacitated), en-
couraging due diligence, and of course encouraging the acceptance of
powers of attorney. In the meantime, courts can and should use the flexi-
bility of the common law to reach the best result in each case in light of
these factors. In addition, because of the uncertainty of these issues, title
companies should continue to exercise caution in accepting a power of
attorney to the extent that they are able.
117. For the Uniform Act, additional commentary would be useful.
